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Abstract 
Effective and safe control of an aircraft may be difficult or nearly impossible for a pilot 
following an unexpected system failure. Without prior training, the pilot must ascertain 
on the fly those changes in both manual control technique and procedures that will lead to 
a safe landing of the aircraft. Sophisticated techniques for determining the required 
control techniques are now available. Likewise, a body of literature on pilot decision 
making provides formalisms for examining how pilots approach discrete decisions 
framed as the selection between options. However, other aspects of behavior, such as the 
task of route planning and guidance, are not as well studied. Not only is the pilot faced 
with possible performance changes to the aircraft dynamics, but he or she is also tasked to 
create a plan of actions that will effectively take the aircraft down to a safe landing. In 
this plan, the many actions that the pilot can perform are closely intertwined with the 
trajectory of the aircraft, making it difficult to accurately predict the final outcome. 
Coupled with the vast number of potential actions to be taken, this problem may seem 
intractable. This is reflected in the lack of a pre-specified procedure capable of giving 
pilots the ability to find a resolution for this task. 
This report summarizes a multi-year effort to examine methods to aid pilots in planning 
an approach and arrival to an airport following an aircraft systems failure. Ultimately, we 
hypothesize that automatic assistance to pilots can be provided in real-time in the form of 
improving pilot control of a damaged aircraft and providing pilots with procedural 
directives suitable for critical flight conditions; such systems may also benefit pilot 
training and procedure design. To achieve this result, a systematic, comprehensive 
research program was followed, building on prior research. This approach included a 
pencil-and-paper study with airline pilots examining methods of representing a flight 
route in an immediately understandable manner, and in a manner that would allow the 
pilot to modify an automatically-generated route and/or detect any inappropriate elements 
in an automatically-generated route. Likewise, a flight simulator study examined 
different cockpit systems for the relative merits of providing pilots with any of a variety 
of automated functions for emergency flight planning. The results provide specific 
guidance for the design of such systems. 
Introduction 
In training, pilots are taught the axiom Aviate, Navigate, and Communicate as a 
fallback procedure during times of crisis. Although useful in regards to providing a 
priority order for the tasks that need to be performed, such an sparse procedure does not 
cover in detail what the tasks are and when to perform them. As guidance during an 
emergency, students are taught several procedures governing such things as engine 
failures that specifically list out the tasks to perform. While these highly detailed 
procedures are helpful to the pilot in regaining stable control of the aircraft, they usually 
terminate with the simple instruction “Find a suitable landing area and land.” At this 
point, the pilot is left to his or her own devices, with little guidance on how this goal 
should be achieved. 
and performing the maneuvers needed to land the aircraft has, in the past, relied heavily 
on pilot experience and judgement. No detailed written procedure covers this planning 
stage and creating a safe trajectory requires the pilot to know the effect that any action 
will have on the aircraft, given the environment and the status of the aircraft itself. For 
example, to turn onto the base leg of an approach, the pilot must realize the radius of the 
turn and initiate the bank ahead of time. In nominal flight, pilots already have the 
necessary “feel” for these relationships based on available information such as airspeed. 
However, in emergency situations where drastic maneuvers are performed, or where the 
aircraft performs differently, this inherent knowledge is no longer accurate and may even 
be detrimental if used improperly. 
Unfamiliarity with the dynamics of an emergency situation places the aircraft at risk. 
Established training procedures for such things as medical emergencies, fires, and an 
assortment of control problems aim to reduce this unfamiliarity. However, many of these 
training procedures only specify certain aspects of the tasks in detail. For example, in 
case of a fire, pilots are asked to memorize the detailed procedures for the immediate 
aircraft systems management. The extent to which training and procedures are provided 
for the guidance task of establishing a safe trajectory down to the ground pales in 
comparison. Subsequently, training for this task is generally comprised simply of 
exposure to the situation in singular simulator scenarios during training. Although 
unstructured, this training is still useful in allowing pilots to form some heuristics about 
what plans may or may not work in similar emergencies. However, this lack of structure 
provides no guarantees, nor feedback, on the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the 
pilot’s rules-of-thumb. 
This lack of emphasis or structure on the guidance task during training may be a 
reflection of the vast amount of variation possible in the factors and circumstances that 
form an emergency. The inability to clearly fix all of the factors governing an emergency 
a priori makes it difficult to predict a suitable procedure or plan that would work in a 
wide range of cases. Thus, flight guidance is a difficult task, not only due to the complex 
calculations required to accurately predict a trajectory, but also due to the numerous 
possible plans available and the fact that in an emergency situation, the task needs to be 
carried out very quickly in stressful circumstances. Pilot formed heuristics serve to 
simplify this problem but impose assumptions on the aircraft system, such as envelope 
The subsequent (equally dificult and typically more lengthy) guidance task of planning 
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limits, and also assumptions about the surrounding environment, such as terrain, which 
may not be valid during an actual emergency. Thus, when such an event occurs in real 
life, it only shares a similarity with past training and therefore requires the pilot to 
extrapolate the required actions based on the perceived differences in the environment 
and aircraft dynamics. This, by its nature, is imprecise and a poor guarantee of safety. 
This report summarizes a multi-year effort to examine methods to aid pilots in 
planning an approach and arrival to an airport following an aircraft systems failure. 
Ultimately, we hypothesize that automatic assistance to pilots can be provided in real- 
time in the form of improving pilot control of a damaged aircraft and providing pilots 
with procedural directives suitable for critical flight conditions; such systems may also 
benefit pilot training and procedure design. To achieve this result, a systematic, 
comprehensive research program was followed, building on prior research. This 
approach included a pencil-and-paper study with airline pilots examining methods of 
representing a flight route in an immediately understandable manner, and in a manner that 
would allow the pilot to modify an automatically-generated route and/or detect any 
inappropriate elements in an automatically-generated route. Likewise, a flight simulator 
study examined different cockpit systems for the relative merits of providing pilots with 
any of a variety of automated functions for emergency flight planning. The results 
provide specific guidance for the design of such systems. 
Background and Previous Work 
Cockpit Aids for In-Flight Re-Planning 
Cockpit aids and safety systems have been widely proposed (and implemented). For 
example, the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) automatically detects 
and determines a plan of actions (or action?) to avoid nearby traffic. From time-critical 
planning systems such as TCAS, it is natural to extrapolate that there exists the possibility 
of automated planning for longer time-scopes, such as descent, arrival, approach and 
landing during emergencies, which could be expected to last anywhere from a few 
minutes to a half-hour. 
However, the task of planning actions to guide the aircraft from its current position to a 
safe landing is a much more complicated problem due to the longer time-scales involved. 
The TCAS avoidance system can quickly determine the best action since it only involves 
the evaluation of an initial action followed by the resulting aircraft trajectory. In contrast, 
a pilot frames a longer-scale trajectory as a sequence of actions to be performed, such as 
turns, descents, and speed or power reductions. In this case, the initial actions and aircraft 
dynamics determine the trajectory only until another action is performed. To make things 
more complicated, as the aircraft trajectory is changed, so does the point at which 
subsequent actions are initiated; for example a turn to intercept a localizer will need to be 
initiated earlier or later in response to changes in the aircraft speed. 
The complexity of the guidance task challenges the pilot to create a viable solution, 
especially in the context of a cockpit during a crisis. Numerous factors contribute to 
making this task difficult, from time-pressures to the unfamiliarity with new aircraft 
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handling characteristics. Both pilot anecdotes and more theoretical studies of human 
machines systems identify that these stressors can force the pilot into more rudimentary 
modes of behavior in which pilots plan ahead with a lower time horizon, with less 
accuracy, based on less information, and with fewer goals. 
Planning aids can be reasonably hypothesized to help with many aspects of the 
planning task. Rational planning can be broken down into (1) generation of alternatives, 
(2) imagining the consequences, (3) valuing (or evaluating) the consequences of the 
alternatives, and (4) choosing one alternative as a plan. Using this categorization, cockpit 
aids, to varying degrees, can be hypothesized to help with any or all of these elements of 
planning: 
(1) Cockpit aids can potentially help pilots identify and generate alternatives for 
evaluation. For example, planning aids can highlight to the pilot items such as 
routes and destinations that do (or don’t) meet obvious criteria such as fuel and time 
constraints, and may, with the addition of a knowledge database, be able to suggest 
useful first-cut solutions using basic heuristics tuned to the nature of the emergency 
(e.g., ‘with pressurization problems, an immediate steep descent should be 
initiated.’) However, for a cockpit system to have this capability requires it to have 
a significant level of intelligence about flight operations and about the goals and 
objectives of pilots during flight re-planning; this knowledge has not yet been 
identified and codified in a manner with sufficient resolution and suitable format 
for inclusion in a decision-aid. 
(2) Given the computational complexity of predicting a trajectory as defined by discrete 
actions, the imaging consequences stage of planning can benefit from the assistance 
of a cockpit system capable of simulating the flight path resulting from a specified 
list of actions, which can then be displayed to the pilot and used in subsequent 
stages of planning. This element of re-planning has already been implemented in a 
previous study. 
by a cockpit aid capable of highlighting safety risks and cost/performance measures 
of any particular trajectory. In engineering terms, this may be framed as giving the 
aid the ability to assess the viability and cost of a potential plan. However, 
implementation of this capability in a cockpit system means it again must be given 
substantial knowledge of the safety constraints and measures which a trajectory 
must satisfy, as well as detailed knowledge of the pilot’s objectives and 
considerations in evaluating a plan; this knowledge has also not yet been identified 
and codified in a manner with sufficient resolution and suitable format for inclusion 
in a decision-aid. 
of assessing the performance of any individual plan, but also of conducting a search 
towards the set of acceptable (or, ideally, optimal) plans. However, the 
development of a cockpit aid to perform this function faces two major hurdles: 
First, as above, the system must be given substantial knowledge of the safety 
constraints and measures, and detailed knowledge of the pilot’s objectives and 
(3) Evaluating the consequences of any sequence of actions, likewise, can be assisted 
(4) Finally, a cockpit aid can help in the selection of a plan when it is capable not only 
considerations in evaluating a plan; Second, the computational algorithms and 
method for searching through the intricate dynamics governing trajectories must be 
implemented. These hurdles are substantial: as with the other steps in planning, the 
knowledge has not yet been identified and codified in a manner with sufficient 
resolution and suitable format for inclusion in a decision-aid; and the development 
of computational algorithms and methods suitable for a trajectory governed by 
continuous-time aircraft dynamics interposed with discrete trajectory changes pose 
a challenging research problem. 
Creating a system capable of assisting the pilot with these aspects of in-flight re- 
planning dictates several key technologies, as shown in Table 1. The primary technology 
is the ability to predict the causal relationship between the actions the pilot wishes to 
perform and the resulting aircraft trajectory. Such ability requires knowledge of the 
current and future flight characteristics of the aircraft, which may be degraded. In 
conjunction with resolving a model for the aircraft, a method is required to simulate the 
behavior of the combined pilot-aircraft behavior as the actions in a flight-plan are 
implemented. As prerequisites for system identification, other supporting technologies 
such as sensor design, fault diagnosis, and aircraft health systems are also needed. To 
provide for effective interaction with pilots, the planner will also require some study into 
the many possible different cockpit interfaces. Finally, to help with stage (4) of planning, 
the system would require some mechanism for generating a plan or, possibly, optimizing 
a flight plan. 
Table 1 - Key Technologies Required 
F A method to predict the flight-path due to the 
r System identification of the flight model. 
F Modeling of pilot-aircraft behavior. 
F Pilot-planner interface. 
r Sensors, fault diagnosis, and aircraft health systems. 
r Plan optimization (possibly) 
Checked items denote focused areas ofprototype. 
causal relationship between actions and trajectory. 
Preliminary Work: Proof-of-Concept Development to Date 
While it is understood that all of these enabling technologies are required to field a 
fully operational in-flight planner, a proof-of-concept first needs to be established before 
any specific technology is researched and matured. Therefore, research to date has 
implemented a proof-of-concept prototype called the Emergency Flight Planner (EFP). 
For the creation of this prototype, not all of the key technologies in Table 1 needed to be 
fully developed. Those that are unchecked can be emulated by their end-effect. At its 
core, the prototype is based on a fast-time simulation. Using this technique, the EFP can 
simulate in detail the aircraft trajectory through the flight-plan entered by the pilot. 
The EFP's pilot interface is shown in Figure 1. It provides both a means for the pilots 
to enter their flight-plan into the EFP, as well as a means to provide feedback about the 
resulting trajectory. Through a virtual Control Display Unit (CDU), they can enter a 
flight-plan using actions that mimic those naturally used during the descent and approach. 
Although the interface merits of the CDU have been debated, most glass-cockpit pilots 
are familiar with it. Once entered, this flight-plan drives an internal EFP simulation of 
the future trajectory, taking into account the actual capabilities of the aircraft. The 
graphical representation of the aircraft trajectory provides feedback to the pilot about the 
feasibility of the plan. In the future, more mature planners may utilize the cursor to 
directly modi@ action triggers and properties directly on the plan and vertical profile 
views, through pop-up menus or other graphical interfaces. Such a fully graphical input 
interface may be more natural, but issues with the ambiguity in cursor modality and 
training requirements need to be resolved. 
Once a list of actions is entered into the EFP, the system can simulate the aircraft as it 
flies this flight-plan. The resultant trajectory is displayed on the north-up plan-view. 
Utilizing the same symbology as a navigation display, this view allows the pilot to see the 
effect of system performance degradations on turns and other trajectory portions. In 
addition to the plan view, a vertical profile view is provided in order for pilots to better 
visualize the descent actions entered into the list. Since the EFP internally simulates the 
aircraft dynamics as it flies through the flight-plan, other states of the aircraft are 
available. A query view was incorporated into the EFP to allow pilots access to this extra 
information about any point along the future trajectory. These include time, speed, 
vertical speed, pitch, bank, &el states, and flap and gear configurations. The format 
resembling a primary flight display (PFD) was selected for its familiarity to the pilot. 
Figure 1 - EFP User Interface 
(Black & White View of Color Display, Inverted for Clarity) 
Preliminary Work: Experimental Evaluation of the Proof-of-Concept System 
with airline pilots as subjects. In addition to determining, quantitatively, whether the 
planner improves the ability of the pilot to perform a safe landing following a major 
system failure or emergency, the experiment also recorded the subjective opinions and 
comments of the pilots. In total, 72 runs were performed. Three different planning tools 
were made available to the pilots (charts only, basic EFP, and the EFP with a pre-loaded 
plan). 
The results found that pilots were more favorable towards an automated planner that 
would present them with a pre-generated plan. This appeared to be mainly a factor of 
workload, since the basic EFP required substantial “programming” of the flight plan in 
order for it to generate a trajectory. Additionally, the performance data verified that 
having pre-generated plans from the EFP were better than plans created by the pilots 
using the planner because they could safely be accomplished in less time. This may be 
attributed to the general trend of the pilots in choosing the first plan that was viable, 
instead of iteratively refining the plan as originally expected; this tendency may be 
reasonably hypothesized to exist both with and without a cockpit aid, as pilots are likely 
to over-rely on the first plan they consider, even if it is not an optimal (or even good) 
plan. 
Two insights into the need for an intelligent cockpit system were identified by the 
results. First, pilots’ goals and objectives change with the context of different emergency 
situations. Second, pilots may not know enough about the aircraft to refrain from 
exceeding system limits - in fact, in some of the runs, the pilots were unable to capture 
their approach course without overly aggressive maneuvers. Together, these points 
illustrate the need for a cockpit aid - and that this aid must have a high degree of 
awareness of context and of pilot goals within that context. 
An experiment was conducted to provide an early evaluation of the efficacy of the EFP, 
Study 1: Presenting Pilots With Emergency Flight Plans 
Although pilots often opted not to plan an emergency flight trajectory in the prior 
research studies, their responses on questionnaires indicated that they liked being 
provided with an emergency flight trajectory by an automated cockpit decision aid. In 
these studies, the trajectory was generated in real-time and represented as a procedure, 
whose elements included turns, speeds, vertical speeds, and aircraft configurations. This 
sentiment is also supported by similar studies (Funk, 1991; Layton, Smith, & McCoy, 
1994; Smith, McCoy, & Layton, 1997), and leads to the question: How do we support a 
human in a task that is too hard for them to perform well in the time provided, but is too 
open-ended for automation to perform perfectly in every situation? We propose to 
address this question by looking at how we can help the pilots more effectively evaluate 
an emergency descent trajectory provided by automation and represented as an emergency 
procedure. 
. 
Previous research has shown that procedure context may aid in reducing the 
likelihood that a worker will blindly adhere to a computer-based procedure (Ockerman & 
Pritchett, 2000; Ockerman & Pritchett, 2004). In the previous research, many elements of 
procedure context were proposed from a literature review but only a few were empirically 
tested. Since the emergency descent trajectories can be represented to pilots as real-time 
procedures, the concept of procedure context may prove useful. The following sections 
provide a background of related research, a description of the study, and its results. 
Background 
Three categories of planning or replanning an aircraft’s trajectory have been 
identified: strategic, tactical, and time-critical (Fan, Hyams, & Kuchar, 1998). Strategic 
planning is defined as being on the scale of hours and days. A strategic plan usually has 
one or two high level goals and specifies its actions abstractly, such as listing out airways 
to follow, without specifying in detail how the aircraft should be flown along the airways. 
Strategic planning is typically done for each flight to determine its flight path in the 
vertical, horizontal, and time dimensions. Strategic planning is typically done by the 
airline before flight in conjunction with air traffic control during the generation of normal 
operating flight plans. 
Time-critical planning is typically on the order of seconds. A time-critical plan is 
made to meet one immediate, pressing constraint and has a high level of detail. These are 
usually evasive maneuvers to quickly avoid a collision with another aircraft or terrain. 
Currently, pilots are aided in time-critical planning with GPWS (Ground Proximity 
Warning System) and TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System). Both of these 
systems warn of impending danger and suggest an immediate evasive maneuver to take in 
great detail such as specifying aircraft pitch, altitude and throttle settings. 
The type of planning that this paper deals with, i.e., planning a trajectory down to 
landing in an emergency, is tactical planning. Tactical planning covers a future duration 
on the scale of minutes. A tactical plan has many goals and constraints and should be 
very detailed. Tactical planning is required when the situation makes the strategic plan 
unworkable; for example, pilots report that they most often have to do tactical replanning 
to avoid potentially dangerous weather systems (Fan et al., 1998). This type of planning 
or replanning is difficult because it requires the detail of time-critical planning but has a 
number of goals and constraints to consider. There has been almost no research into 
planning trajectories in emergencies and very little on tactical planning in general. 
There are studies on more strategic flight planning that provide some insight into 
pilots’ needs during tactical flight planning. Layton, Smith and McCoy (Layton et al., 
1994; Smith et al., 1997) looked at en-route planning to avoid possibly troublesome 
weather systems. The experiments evaluated the interaction between an automatic 
weather planning aid and aviation users. The researchers determined that it would be 
infeasible to completely automate the task of planning a route around bad weather. The 
studies looked at three levels of aid being provided to the users. The lowest level of aid 
consisted of a ‘sketching-only’ system where the user planned the route from scratch and 
the system provided the results of various calculations (e.g., total distance, total time, and 
fuel consumption). The middle level of aid consisted of a ‘route constraints and 
sketching’ system where the user provides some constraints (e.g., shortest distance and 
lowest fuel consumption) and the system provides routes that meet the constraints. The 
highest level of aid consisted of an ‘automatic route constraints, route constraints, and 
sketching’ system where the system provided a route immediately. Overall, the users of 
the lowest level of aid developed more conservative plans than the users of the higher 
levels of aid accepted from the system. In addition, the users of the lowest level had 
difficulty in optimizing for a particular constraint, such as fuel efficiency. In the most 
difficult situations, users of the lowest level aid did not explore more alternatives than the 
users of the other two levels of aid though they did in the easier situations. Finally, users 
of the two higher levels of aid seemed biased toward selecting the computer-generated 
plan even when they generated their own plans as alternatives, thus showing a potential 
problem with automation-bias and/or over-reliance. This study illustrates the difficulty 
that arises when a task is difficult for the human to do on their own, but also too open- 
ended to always provide an optimal automated solution. 
Another study that provides some insight into pilots’ needs from an aiding system 
examined a cockpit task management aid (Funk, 1991 ; Chou, Madhavan, & Funk, 1996). 
In low-fidelity simulator studies they provided pilots with a color-coded task list of the 
tasks that needed to be accomplished for the current phase of flight. The task list was 
generated with consideration of the current phase of flight and state of the aircraft. The 
task management aid did improve the performance of the pilots in this study. In addition, 
the pilots reported that they liked to have an automatically generated list of tasks to be 
completed. However, this study did not examine what the pilots would do if the task list 
were incorrect in some way. 
prototype emergency flight planner (EFP) by airline pilots (Chen & Pritchett, 200 1 , 
detailed earlier). Of interest here, in one scenario the automatic EFP plan was inaccurate, 
but a majority of the pilots still followed it until it became obvious that it was based on a 
faulty model of the aircraft dynamics and would not lead to a safe landing. Likewise, 
pilots’ interaction with automation and its representation of the trajectory was found to be 
problematic. (Pritchett et al., 2001) 
All of these previous studies provide some support for the idea that pilots can be 
aided by the provision of an automatically-generated plan, represented as a detailed 
procedure; however, two studies (Layton et al., 1994; Chen & Pritchett, 2001) also 
indicate that pilots may have problems with rejecting a procedure that is faulty, a form of 
automation bias (Mosier & Skitka, 1999). Layton, Smith and McCoy (1 994) suggest 
avoiding this problem by providing the pilot with more than one procedure and 
“forceing” them to choose between them or come up with their own. This may be a way 
to get the pilot more actively involved in the judgment process but, depending on the 
circumstances, it may be difficult to come up with two good procedures and, if one is bad, 
then the pilot’s time during an emergency is diverted to an unnecessary task. In addition, 
current evidence suggests that the pilots would likely choose one of the procedures 
instead of creating their own. Another suggestion is to have a critiquing system 
(Guerlain, Smith, Obradovich, Rudmann, Strohm, Smith, Svirbely & Sachs, 1999) (based 
on an expert system) that watches the pilot’s planning and lets the pilot know when they 
Finally, the previous work by the principal investigator examined the use of a 
are doing something that the critiquer is not expecting. This suggestion has particular 
problems associated with it for tactical planning, which pilots normally do not explicitly 
perform and for which expert systems are not available. 
they allow the operators to make their own decision, it may not be the best decision, 
particularly if time pressures are involved. Sometimes the dynamics of the situation 
cannot be reliably determined by a person without significant effort and training. 
However, if they allow the decision aid to make the decision, then it can be brittle in the 
face of unexpected circumstances. The choices are to either aid the operator in making a 
decision or present the operator with a finalized decision and aid the operator in 
evaluating that solution. The earlier studies in emergency flight planning suggest that the 
latter choice is more appropriate for this task. 
However, previous research indicates that there will almost always be bias present if 
the system suggests a solution before the human has figured out their own solution, but, 
as mentioned earlier, it is not always feasible to wait or to expect a human to develop 
their own solution in the time provided. We hypothesize that providing an emergency 
descent trajectory that is supported by the presentation ofprocedure context may help the 
pilot to make a better judgment of its accuracy and feasibility. 
Designers of decision aids often find themselves caught in an ambiguous situation. If 
Procedure Context 
Borrowing the definition from the Merriam-Webster dictionary for context, procedure 
context is defined as procedure information that provides the interrelated conditions in 
which an individual procedure step exists or occurs. In other words, procedure context is 
procedure information that clarifies the meaning, purpose, conditions, and relationships 
of the individual procedure steps to the procedure, task, and environment. Procedure 
context situates the present procedure step in the larger purpose and organization of the 
procedure. Thus, the user is aware of more than just a series of isolated commands. 
Procedure context might also provide a window on the thought processes of the 
procedure designer and thus insights on how the procedure applies to the current 
situation. In this research, automation is the procedure designer. 
Specific elements of procedure context have been identified through a review of 
literature and procedures (Ockerman & Pritchett, 2000). These elements may not 
comprise an exhaustive list but do provide a sufficient basis to begin to evaluate the 
possible benefits of procedure context in different environments (Ockerman & Pritchett, 
2004). These individual elements are either known early in the procedure’s life-cycle or 
are implicitly part of a completed procedure; as such, procedure context is not adding 
information to a procedure but making the relevant pieces of information explicit to the 
user. 
It is typically not possible to provide procedures that meet the needs of every possible 
situation (Wright, Pocock, & Fields, 1998; Vicente, 1999). As such, procedures serve as 
guidelines to the way the task should be completed if the conditions match those for 
which the procedure is intended. Thus it is important to encourage designers to consider 
users as ‘cognitive beings’ as opposed to servants of an aiding system. As a cognitive 
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being, the user can react to the situation and interpret the procedure to fit the current 
situation (Suchman, 1987; Dien, Montmayeul, & Beltranda, 199 1 ; Wright et al., 1998). 
Some of the over-reliance literature points to the importance of communication of 
actions and motives in the appropriate interaction of humans and machines. Although 
one cannot force a user to be cognitively involved in a task, without sufficient 
information on the underlying purpose and structure of an aid informed cognitive 
involvement is not possible. Without sufficient information to make decisions, and to 
evaluate and assess the situation, the user is reduced to following the instructions one by 
one (Swezey, 1987). Therefore, procedure context is the information necessary to 
encourage users to be cognitive beings and thus appropriately rely on an aiding system. 
The procedure context elements used in this study are considered explanatory, which 
means they supply meaning, purpose, relationships, or conditions. Explanatory elements 
are a window into the procedure designers’ reasons for the current procedure, providing 
information about reasoning, conditions for use, and a strategy for using the procedure. 
The explanatory procedure context lets the user know when the procedure does not match 
the current situation and can aid the user in determining other ways of accomplishing the 
task in a different but safe manner. 
Explanatory procedure context elements are frequently not included in a finished 
procedure but might be covered when a user is trained on the procedure or on the job. 
However, the designer of the procedure presumably knows explanatory procedure context 
elements since this type of information is needed in designing a procedure. The designer 
must convert the dynamics and structure of a task and its relationship to an external, 
changing environment into an understandable and effective static representation that can 
be used over and over. Unfortunately, all this knowledge is rarely explicitly published in 
the final procedure and is often effectively “lost” to the user. It has been noted that 
sometimes a significant amount of time transpires before a worker might realize why the 
procedure is designed as it is (Hutchins, 1995), and even then there is no guarantee that 
he or she has formed a correct interpretation. 
Explanatory information about the task, such as rationale, has been shown to increase 
the rate at which each step is read, aids in recalling the steps of the procedure at a later 
time, and improves performance when performing the task without the procedure (Smith 
& Goodman, 1984). In addition, knowing the background of a procedure can ease worker 
resistance to a procedure by providing insight into the relevance of the procedure to 
effective task completion (McCarthy, Wright, Monk, & Watts, 1998; Wright et al., 1998; 
deBrito, 1999). 
The three explanatory elements used in this study are: 
Rationale The rationale element provides the reason for each procedural step; that is, 
why this step is included in the procedure. In one study, inspection of a commercial 
pilot’s own copy of procedures found that 38% of the annotations made by the pilot could 
be classified as notes on “why a procedure is the way it is” (Wright et al., 1998, p. 3). 
Knowledge of a step’s rationale can aid the user in understanding when this particular 
step is appropriate for the current situation and improve his or her knowledge about the 
procedure. 
Triggering Conditions The triggering conditions element identifies the events that 
signal the starting or stopping of a procedural action. Triggering conditions are events 
that are external to the procedure. For example, crossing a fix may trigger a change in 
speed and descent rate. Making procedure followers aware of triggering conditions can 
help them to determine not only when a step should be done but also provide insight into 
the relationship between the environment and the task. 
Ordinalitv The ordinality element defines any order requirements; i.e., when an 
action must be done before or after other actions, or when it does not matter. For 
example, an aircraft must be at a certain speed before deploying the flaps: otherwise the 
aircraft structure could be damaged. However, other actions may not have ordinality 
requirements and can be done in any order or simultaneously. Thus, the ordinality differs 
from the triggering conditions in that it only concerns the order of the procedure steps, not 
their relation to external events. 
Method 
This study investigated how a real-time procedure should be represented so that a 
pilot can quickly determine whether a procedure generated by an emergency flight 
planning aid will lead to a safe landing and therefore whether or not he or she should 
follow it. 
Participants and Apparatus 
A total of 32 active, commercial pilots participated in this study, with 28 of them 
volunteering demographic data. Those pilots had an average of 1 1,500 flight hours, with 
just over 4000 hours in glass cockpits. Twenty-two of the participants were captains, five 
were first officers, and one was neither. 
The eight emergency scenarios they evaluated were presented on paper and consisted 
of 6 items (see Figure 1): (1) a description of the emergency that has occurred along with 
a picture of the primary flight display and navigation display indicating current aircraft 
state, (2) an enroute map for the new airport, (3) an approach plate for the new airport, (4) 
a STAR chart for the new airport, ( 5 )  horizontal and vertical map displays of the 
suggested descent path, and (6) a text procedure for the suggested descent. 
Bruin Briefing 
The spoilers were unexpectedly deployed. Now they are stuck. You have control of 
the aircraft and it appears to be stable. While testing the aircraft’s maneuverability you 
have determined that you can bank the plane between the red bank limits on your PFD. 
The closest available airport of sufficient length is Bruin International, on the Islands 
of Virginia. You start a descent towards the airport. 
At this moment your navigation display is showing as below. 
Figure la. Description of emergency with primaryfliglzt display and navigation 
display 
Bruin 
Figure 1 b. Horizontal and vertical map displays 
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Procedure 
The pilots were told that they were the captains of a glass cockpit commercial jet and 
that an emergency had occurred which required that they land immediately at the nearest 
airport. The emergencies may or may not have affected the performance of the plane and 
none had terrain or traffic conflicts. Each scenario consisted of a written description of 
the emergency and the current location of the plane. To replicate the time-criticality of 
emergency situations, the pilots were given 3 minutes to evaluate each procedure, which 
contained actions that would establish a trajectory to the airport, and record their response 
on a questionnaire. On the questionnaire, the pilots categorized each procedure as one 
they would be comfortable flying or one they would not be comfortable flying, and 
explained why or why not. They also provided their confidence in their response as a 
percentage. 
Design 
This experiment used a 24 factorial design. The first factor was the condition of the 
aircraft (performance altered [PA] or not [NPA]), the second factor was the accuracy of 
the procedure, the third factor was the structure used in the presentation of the procedure, 
and the fourth factor was the presence of rationale (i.e., explanations). 
Performance of the aircraft in each scenario was either altered in some way [PA] (e.g., 
lost engine or loose aileron control surface) or was not [NPA] (e.g., sick passenger). 
Determining the future flight trajectory of a performance-altered aircraft is more difficult 
due to its unpredictable nature and inexperience with an aircraft in that particular 
condition. 
Half of the eight procedures were inaccurate. The inaccuracies were of two types. In 
one type of inaccuracy the graphic map display accompanying the procedure was redrawn 
to show a much tighter turn radius at some point in the descent than feasible for the 
aircraft’s speed and configuration at that time. In the other type the graphic vertical 
profile was altered to show an infeasible glide slope intercept, Le., where the aircraft was 
at least 1000 feet too high to intercept the glide slope with the descent rate given by the 
procedure. In both cases the text accurately listed a series of actions that created the 
infeasible procedure. 
The two structure variants and two presence of rationale variants resulted in four 
distinct display formats The structure was either sequential or concurrent. The sequential 
structure listed all the actions that were required to complete the descent in a single 
column and noted when to do each action by attaching a ‘fix’ to the action that was also 
presented on the graphical display (see Figure 2). The concurrent structure listed the 
actions in a matrix where the columns related to horizontal motion, vertical motion, 
speed, or configuration, with all concurrent actions listed in the same row (see Figure 3). 
Again each row was notated with a fix and/or event to indicate when they should be done. 
The rationales, when provided, explained why an action should be done in general and/or 
done at a particular time (see Figure 2). Thus, the four formats are sequential, sequential 
with rationales, concurrent, and concurrent with rationales. 
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Figure 2. Sequential structure with rationale 
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Figure 3. Concurrent structure without rationale 
Table 1. Scenario Descriptions 
Scenario Condition Accuracy Structure Rationale 
1 PA Accurate Sequential Not present 
2 PA Inaccurate Concurrent Not present 
3 NPA Inaccurate Sequential Not present 
4 NPA Accurate Concurrent Not present 
5 NPA Inaccurate Concurrent Present 
6 NPA Accurate Sequential Present 
7 PA Accurate Concurrent Present 
8 PA Inaccurate Sequential Present 
We blocked on the factor rationale to mitigate learning effects, so the pilots either saw 
a combination of scenarios 1-4 and then scenarios 5-8 or they saw scenarios 5-8 and then 
scenarios 1-4. We used 8 different scenario orders; four pilots did each order of scenarios 
(see Table 1). 
These display formats correlate with the three procedure context elements discussed 
earlier. The rationales used as an experimental factor map directly to the rationale 
procedure context element. The trigger condition and ordinality elements map to the plan 
structure. The trigger conditions for the sequential structure are listed as fixes while the 
trigger conditions for the concurrent structure are fixes and speed events. For example, at 
the point where the aircraft will have slowed to a safe extension of flaps 1, the trigger 
condition is fix FLPl and the speed event 238knt (VF~).  The ordinality element in the 
sequential structure is a simple linear order that arbitrarily orders actions at the same fix. 
For the concurrent structure the ordinality element is more clearly shown, with the matrix 
format illustrating that actions attached to the same fix should be done at roughly the 
same time but that the exact order is not important. 
Measurements 
Measurement consisted of the pilots’ responses to the presented procedures and a 
follow-up questionnaire. These included the pilots’ responses (Le., whether they would 
or would not follow the procedure), the confidence they assigned to their response, the 
correctness of their responses (i.e., whether their response matched the flight procedures’ 
accuracy), and the correctness of the pilots’ reasoning about the procedure as recorded in 
written comments. The questionnaire measurements are the pilots’ opinions about the 
different presentations of the procedure. 
Results 
There were 256 data points for each of the response variables: pilot responses, pilot 
confidence, correctness of pilot responses, and correctness of pilot reasoning. In addition 
to the four experimental factors, the pilot group, which represents the order in which the 
pilots saw the different scenarios, was also examined for main effects, but was shown to 
not have an effect for any of the response variables. 
Pilot Responses 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) general linear model (GLM) (type I11 adjusted sum 
of squares) was used to analyze for effects. The GLM for pilot responses versus the four 
experimental factors: performance of the aircraft (PA or NPA), procedure accuracy 
(accurate or inaccurate), procedure structure (sequential or concurrent), and the presence 
of rationale showed that only the aircraft condition, PA or NPA, is a statistically 
significant factor (see Table 2). Examination of the data shows that pilots were more 
likely to respond ‘No’ (not comfortable following) in performance-altered conditions and 
‘Yes’ (comfortable) in non-performance-altered conditions. 
Table 2. GLM for Pilot Response Versus the Four Experimental Factors 
Source DF SeqSS AdjSS AdjMS F P 
Condition I 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 17.00 0.000 
Accuracy I 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.27 0.607 
Structure I 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 2.39 0.123 
Rationale I 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 1.06 0.304 
Error 251 59.0625 59.0625 0.2353 
Total 255 63.9375 
Pilot Confidence Level in Response 
The GLM for pilot confidence level versus the experimental design factors also had a 
significant factor - performance of the aircraft once again (see Table 3). Examination of 
the data showed that the pilots had a higher level of confidence with non-performance 
altering conditions. This is not surprising but does show that the pilots did account for 
the aircraft performance when making their judgment. 
Table 3. GLM for Pilot Confidence Versus the Four Experimental Factors 
Source DF SeqSS AdjSS AdjMS F P 
Condition I 1891.6 1896. I 1896.1 4.15 0.043 
Accuracy I 100.0 97. I 97. I 0.21 0.645 
Structure I 19.0 19.4 19.4 0.04 0.837 
Rationale I 113.4 113.4 113.4 0.25 0.619 
Error 248 113425.7 113425.7 457.4 
Total 252 115549.6 
Correctness of Pilot Response 
For the correctness of the pilots’ responses when compared to the accuracy of the 
presented procedures, none of the four experimental factors had a statistically significant 
effect. In fact, on the whole the pilots did little better than chance (52%) on correctly 
judging the accuracy of the presented procedures. 
Correctness of Pilot Reasoning 
Finally, the correctness of the pilots’ reasoning for accepting or not accepting a 
procedure was analyzed by categorizing pilots’ reasoning and then comparing these 
categorizations with those provided by a subject matter expert. Looking at the four 
experimental factors versus correctness in pilot reasoning showed that two of the factors 
were statistically significant: accuracy of the presented procedure and rationale (see 
Table 4). Examination of the data showed that the pilots had more accurate reasoning for 
accurate scenarios. This is not surprising since they basically only had to agree that it was 
done correctly. In addition, further analysis showed that procedures displaying rationale 
resulted in more correct reasoning by the pilots. 
Table 4. GLM for Pilot Rationale Accuracy Versus the Four Experimental Factors 
Source DF SeqSS AdjSS AdjMS F P 
Condition 1 0.0352 0.0352 0.0352 0.21 0.650 
Accuracy 1 0.6602 0.6602 0.6602 3.87 0.050 
Structure I 0.1914 0.1914 0.1914 1.12 0.290 
Rationale 1 1.7227 1.7227 1.7227 10.10 0.002 
Error 251 42.7930 42.7930 0.1705 
Total 255 45.4023 
Questionnaire Results 
The questionnaire measures came from the opinions of the pilots on the four different 
formats. Of the four different formats, 45% of the pilots with an opinion preferred the 
concurrent with rationale format. Overall, 67% of the pilots with an expressed opinion 
preferred the concurrent format over the sequential format, and 91% of the pilots with an 
expressed opinion preferred having rationales over not having rationales. 
Discussion 
As is often the case with experiments of this type, There were large individual 
differences between the pilots in their acceptance of the procedures and their reasoning 
for that acceptance. In addition, overall the pilots were little better than chance at 
distinguishing procedures that correspond to a trajectory leading to a safe landing from 
those that do not. This is not surprising since this is a task that they have rarely, if ever, 
performed and does not have any standardized training. Pilots do practice emergency 
situations in simulator training but these focus more on the initial procedural response to 
the emergency than on planning a new trajectory on the fly to descend to an airport. 
were the pilots more likely to accept a procedure in the NPA condition, they also had 
more confidence in that acceptance. This may be due to a higher level of comfort with a 
“normal” aircraft that should perform as expected. However, this comfort may be 
misapplied, as they often indicated they would follow inaccurate NPA procedures. 
When the four experimental factors were examined in relation to correctness of pilot 
reasoning, procedure accuracy and the presence of rationale were significant. Having the 
However, there are several interesting aspects of the results of this study. Not only 
correct reasoning for an accurate procedure was not overly difficult since basically the 
pilot had to just accept the procedure as correct without listing caveats. More 
interestingly, the procedures with rationales lead to a more correct reasoning by the pilot 
for acceptance or non-acceptance of a procedure. The pilots also reported that they liked 
being provided with the rationale of a procedure. There is no support for the structure of 
the procedure impacting the pilots’ responses or correctness in the objective results, 
although a majority of the pilots did prefer the concurrent structure over the sequential 
structure. 
This study suggests that the presence of rationales or explanations for automatically 
generated decisions can aid the operators in more correct reasoning about that decision; 
however, it did not impact the correctness of their response to follow or not follow the 
decision. Further investigation is needed to understand both why pilot performance at 
this task is so poor and why this contextual information did not improve the pilots’ 
judgments. However, these results indicate that including rationale with a suggested plan 
of action can improve some aspects of operator performance which might lead to 
enhanced system function and help operators deal with the potential brittleness of 
automatic systems. This finding has implications for both the design of procedures and 
the design of automatic systems that suggest courses of action to a human in situations 
that cannot be fully evaluated by the procedure or automatic system. 
Study 2: Automated Systems and Emergency Flight Planning 
Research on planning has emphasized automation with a view to alleviating the 
workload on pilots and dispatchers either by automating planning processes or delegating 
decision-making away fiom the flight deck. However, few studies have examined the 
behavioral aspects of planning in general and the impact of automation in particular. This 
is especially true for “tactical planning”, i.e., planning in a time horizon on the order of 
tens of minutes. Thus it is hypothesized that some automation in the flight deck should be 
available that could assist air transport pilots in tactical planning by considering many 
factors about the immediate and near-term situation. 
In this study, a flight simulator experiment was conducted to study airline pilot 
performance in tactical replanning tasks using several different autoflight systems. Each 
pilot was placed into either a non nominal or an emergency situation which required 
replanning. All pertinent checklists were assumed to have been performed and the aircraft 
was currently in stable flight. His or her immediate task was to replan the current flight 
and fly down to the final approach. 
Background And Motivation 
Formally, a flight plan is a list of destinations or waypoints, their associated altitudes 
and speeds, and a destination which is to be filed with a legal authority before a flight. 
Functionally, the term “plan” can also refer to a succession of goals and actions that are 
designed and executed to fulfill the final objective. 
In air transport, flight plans are typically created by the pilot and dispatcher, and 
approved (and potentially modified) by air traffic operators before take-off. In addition, a 
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substantial amount of re-planning may need to be done on the fly during flight, where 
pilots have real time access to more current information sources. 
Flight planning is essential as it is a process by which a suitable set of high level 
actions is created that will enable the flight to reach its destination. At a base level, flying 
an aircraft is essentially an exercise in managing available resources including time, fuel, 
energy, or a combination thereof. Management of these resources is crucial to an efficient 
flight and to do this the pilot must incorporate knowledge about the current environment. 
In higher workload situations, especially emergencies, pilots may face near impossible 
demands on their time. Flight planning offers a reduction of workload during later stages 
by enabling the pilot to follow a predetermined plan, and also can establish an efficient 
and safe trajectory throughout the flight. 
Technological developments have made it possible to automate more and more 
functions in the flight deck and in other high workload and dynamic domains. 
Automation in the flight deck has evolved from the most basic autopilots to sophisticated 
systems such as flight management systems. Similarly, automation to maintain flight 
safety has also seen a sea change with the development of systems such as the Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and the Ground Proximity Warning 
System (GPWS). The introduction of advanced technology on modern flight decks has 
succeeded in increasing the precision and efficiency of flight operations. 
As part of this trend, systems have been developed that assist pilots with time-critical 
planning. For example, TCAS calculates an avoidance maneuver and displays it to the 
pilot, and the GPWS has a built-in aural alert which alerts the pilot to perform a standard 
avoidance maneuver. Due to their time critical nature, such re-planning tools have the 
characteristic of a forcing function on the pilot and are inherently automatic and assertive 
in nature. Another important element of modem flight deck automation is the Flight 
Management System (FMS). 
“The FMS supports the pilots in a variety of tasks, such as flight planning, navigation 
and guidance, performance management and monitoring of flight progress.” (Sarter and 
Woods, 1994). The major FMS interfaces for the pilot are the mode control panel (MCP) 
and the control display units (CDUs).The FMS is also intricately tied to many cockpit 
displays, including the primary flight displays (PFDs), and electronic horizontal situation 
indicators (EHSI), which display information about the autoflight modes and the current 
route of flight. 
The CDUs consist of a keyboard and a data display screen. The keyboard is used by 
the pilots to enter data that define a flight path and to access flight related data available 
in the numerous display pages. The pilot-entered flight path is continuously updated to 
reflect current flight status and is presented on the EHSI when in map mode. This allows 
pilots to monitor progress along the path. In the EHSI plan mode, the pilot can visually 
check modifications to the active flight plan. 
The MCP is used to activate different automatic flight modes such as: Vertical 
Navigation (VNAV), Lateral Navigation (LNAV), Heading Select (HDG SEL) and Flight 
Level Change (FLCH). The pilot can also use knobs on the MCP to dial in targets for 
individual parameters (airspeed, heading, altitude, and vertical speed), which are tracked 
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when their corresponding automatic flight mode is activated. To find out which FMS 
modes are currently active, the pilot can monitor the flight mode annunciations on the 
PFD. These provide data on the active (or armed) pitch and roll modes and on the status 
of the autopilot(s). They also indicate the status and mode of the autothrottles, which can 
be set to either manual or automatic mode for speed and altitude control. The various 
FMS interfaces combine to provide the pilot with a high degree of flexibility in selecting 
and combining levels of automation to respond to different situations. 
The FMS can also help with flight planning. When the authorized flight plan is being 
entered into the FMS while the aircraft is at the gate, it would be considered as being used 
for strategic planning purposes, and when a reroute is being planned in the air for the next 
few minutes of flight, it would be considered as being used for tactical planning. The 
FMS can also provide a "what-if" capability (Honeywell, 1996). For example, the pilot 
can query the FMS to determine how much extra fuel will be burned if he or she increases 
speed by Mach 0.02. This provides pilots the information needed to evaluate new plans. 
Recent accidents and incidents involving glass aircraft suggests that the increase in 
automation in the flight deck also have a degree of operational burden associated with 
them. This can lead to various breakdowns in the overall human-machine system. This 
has been hypothesized to arise from the complexity of the FMS itself andor poor 
portrayal to the pilot of its functioning. Studies exploring the pilots' mode awareness and 
understanding of the functional structure of automation are plentiful. However, less 
research has examined its utility for tactical planning. 
Objectives 
The main objectives of this experiment were to study: 
Pilot planning performance at in-flight re-planning in non-nominal and 
emergency flight conditions; 
Pilot planning behavior for in-flight re-planning in non-nominal and 
emergency flight conditions; 
The impact of cockpit automation on the planning process. 0 
Additionally, this experiment was also a preliminary investigation of an intelligent 
cockpit aid capable of automatic flight plan generation. This investigation was 
preliminary in that only the concept of such a system was explored and the plans used for 
the experiment were preprogrammed into the planning interfaces. 
Method 
In each experiment the pilots faced either a non nominal or an emergency situation 
about 30 minutes (85-90 miles) from landing. Before that start of each flight, pilots were 
given a scenario briefing (Appendix B.4) along with paper charts. They were given 25 
seconds to go through the charts before the run was started. Their task was to replan the 
route while in flight, with the assumption that the all pertinent checklists had already been 
completed, the situation contained, and control of the aircraft had been regained just 
before the run started. 
A confederate pilot was present in all runs. The main function of the confederate pilot 
was to get clearances from air traffic control, deploy the flaps and gear when asked by the 
test pilot, and to enforce the type of automation used for the run, i.e., in the CDU (and its 
variants) cases, pilots were not allowed to use the MCP and vice versa. 
Sixteen pilots took part in the experiment. Each pilot ran nine flights for a total of 144 
runs. The run order was determined by a test matrix which was a balanced combination of 
two independent variables: type of automation and scenario type, based on a Latin Square 
design. The types of automation tested were MCP, CDU, CDU+ and CDUtt-. The 
scenario types were classified into two types, non nominal and emergency. 
distance, latitude and longitude) and identifiable actions in the autoflight systems (such as 
speed changes, altitude changes and heading changes). Additionally, pilots were also 
asked to fill a questionnaire at the end of each run and at the end of the experiment. 
The simulator logged important data including aircraft state variables (such as speed, 
Scenario Design 
To avoid pilot familiarity with a common arrival route, fictitious airports and arrival 
routes were used for the experiment. The airports were adapted from those previously 
utilized in two other experiments to study arrival procedures and cockpit display of traffic 
information (Yankosky and Pritchett, 1999) and the Emergency Flight Planner (EFP) 
(Chen and Pritchett, 2000). A new airport for the training runs and a number of 
waypoints, fixes and navigation aids were added to the existing charts. Terrain was not a 
consideration in the experiment. 
A total of ten airports and their related charts were used for the experiment, one for 
each scenario. Four airports were reserved for non nominal scenarios, four for emergency 
scenarios, one for the faulty Autoplan scenario and one for the training scenario. The 
tenth airport reserved for the faulty Autoplan scenario and was used for both non nominal 
and emergency scenarios. 
All the scenarios were designed to be of equal difficulty. The initial positions of the 
aircraft at the start of the scenarios were placed such that pilots could choose to approach 
the airport from either the left or the right of the runway. The run was terminated once 
pilots had intercepted the localizer at glideslope altitude at the outer marker. Before the 
start of each run, pilots were given a briefing sheet. Given below is a sample of a non- 
nominal scenario briefing and an emergency scenario briefing. 
Sample non-nominal briefing: 
Atlantic Briefing 
" 
You are heading along the Townhouse One Arrival at Atlantic International Airport and are 13 
miles past VOR CLR[114.0 CLR], when you receive word from ATC that there is severe 
turbulence directly in your path ahead and spanning the area shown in your en-route chart. 
The destination is runway RW29L at Atlantic International. Your current state is: 
heading 347" 
13000 ft altitude (-1200 fpm) 
290IAS 
Start your replanning from this point. 
Sample emergency briefing: 
Bruin Briefing 
You were heading along the Braddock Arrival, when your alarm systems detected a fire in the 
cargo hold. The fire has been put out by the flight attendants, but the extent of the damage is not 
clear. You are 52 miles past VOR BRN [114.0 BRN], by the time you decide to declare an 
emergency and all standard procedures and checklists have been completed. 
The destination is runway RW 18R at Bruin International Airport and your current state is: 
e heading 34" 
250IAS 
9000 ft altitude (- 1200 fpm) 
Start your replanning from this point. 
Additionally, pilots were also provided paper cllarts for the area based on the 
current Jeppesen standard. The paper charts included an en-route chart, a Standard 
Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) chart and an approach plate. These charts are shown in 
Figures 4 , 5  and 6 .  
Figure 4 - Sample En-route Chart 
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Figure 6 - Sample Approach Plate 
Experiment Procedure 
The experiment started by getting the informed consent of the participating pilot. This 
was followed by a briefing about the experiment and the simulator. Prior to the data runs, 
the pilots were put through training tutorials to acquaint them with the simulator and the 
experimental setup. This tutorial briefing is supplied in Appendix A. The two tutorials 
were separated into two phases, one to get acquainted with the various types of 
automation, and the other to experience a complete scenario. In the first phase of training, 
the pilot was asked to fly one run using only the MCP. When the pilot was comfortable 
using the MCP, the first tutorial was restarted and the pilot was exposed to the CDU type 
of automation and its variants. This phase of training was repeated till the pilot verbally 
expressed a satisfactory level of proficiency and comfort using all the types of 
automation. This was followed by the second phase of training, where the pilot was asked 
to fly a complete scenario using all the automation types to give him a better 
understanding of what to expect during the data runs. Following the completion of 
training, the pilots were shown the questionnaires that would follow all experimental 
runs. Upon completion of both tutorials, the pilots were then given the choice to review 
any of the previous tutorials or to continue on with the actual experimental runs. 
scenario) were run for each pilot. For each of the scenarios, the pilot was given a 
description of the scenario in a briefing sheet and also told what type of automation they 
would be given. In addition, pilots were also told that all pertinent checklists had been 
completed and they had only to plan up to the termination point. A first officer was 
present during all the runs to start the runs, monitor aircraft systems, deploy the flaps and 
gears as requested and communicate ATC clearances to the test pilot. The first officer 
played no part in the planning task. In all the runs, the pilots were told the type of 
automation to use. In the CDU (and its variants) conditions, the pilot was not allowed to 
use the MCP except to make changes in the altitude window (this was needed since in 
typical MCP-FMS operation, the aircraft will not climb above or descend below the 
altitude specified in the MCP altitude window). 
Following each scenario, the pilot was given a set of questions pertaining to that 
scenario. At the conclusion of all the data runs, the pilot was given a brief set of questions 
pertaining to their background, the experiment as a whole, in-flight replanning and 
planning tools. 
Following the tutorial session, a total of nine scenarios (including the faulty Autoplan 
Experiment Participants 
A total of sixteen pilots participated in the experiment. Fifteen pilots were from a 
major airline carrier and one from a major charter service with experience in a major 
airline service. One pilot was recently retired. All the subjects were male. All the subjects 
were either captains or first officers. 
Total piloting hours ranged from 5000 to 16,000. Eight of the test subjects were 
captains with experience ranging from 12,000 to 16,000 hours and an average of 12,250 
hours of flying experience. The other eight were first officers with experience ranging 
from 5000 to 10,500 hours and an average of 7400 hours of flying experience. Eleven 
pilots were initially military trained before becoming civilian pilots and 5 pilots were 
initially trained in civil aviation. The subjects had flown or were current in a range of 
glass-cockpit aircraft, including the Boeing 737-800, 737-300NG, 757,767, and MD-88. 
Of the 16 pilots, 6 had previous experience with flight planning software of some sort 
before (other than the FMS), with all six being exposed to ground based planning 
software and one pilot with experience in ground based (B.A.R.T) and in-flight 
replanning software (Global Data Systems). All subjects were compensated for their time. 
Experiment Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted on a fixed-base desktop flight simulator based on the 
Boeing 747-400. The flight simulator has been developed using the Reconfigurable Flight 
Simulator (RFS) software (Ippolito and Pritchett, 2000). The simulator runs on two 
networked desktops PCs. One screen shows the flight instruments, namely, the Primary 
Flight Display (PFD), Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI) (also known as 
the Navigation Display [ND]), and controls for the flaps and gears. The second screen 
displays the Mode Control Panel (MCP), the Control Display Unit (CDU) and navigation 
display controls (ND controls). Both the desktops PCs were equipped with a mouse as an 
input device. The setup was distributed over four flat panel LCD screens with two screens 
- one displaying the PFD, EHSI and flaps and gears, and the other displaying the CDU, 
MCP and ND controls - for the captain and two screens showing the same displays for the 
first officer. Figure 7 shows the experiment setup. 
Figure 7 - Experiment Setup for Each Pilot 
The flight instruments included the primary flight display (PFD), electronic horizontal 
situation indicator (EHSI), the Mode Control Panel (MCP) and Control Display Unit (CDU), 
all of which are based on the Boeing 747-400 glass cockpit. 
The PFD (Figure 8) shows the current aircraft state such as the current airspeed and altitude. At 
the top center of the PFD are the Flight Mode Annunciators (FMAs) which display which mode of 
flight the autopilot is in. The magenta figures above the altitude and speed tapes show the MCP 
target altitude and target speed respectively. The vertical speed indicator beside the altitude tape 
shows the rate of climb or descent. The two magenta bars in the middle of the display are the Flight 
Directors (F/D) which show the pitch and roll of the aircraft. The arrow indicator at the top of the 
calibrated scale on the artificial horizon indicates the bank angle. 
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Figure 8 - Primary Flight Display (PFD) 
The EHSI (Figure 9) used in this experiment is based on that used in the B747-400. The EHSI is 
comprised mainly of a track up moving map display. The display shows the current flight path as a 
solid magenta line. Any lateral modification to the current active flight path is shown by a white 
stippled line. The current position of the aircraft is shown as a solid white triangle. The green arc 
shows the point where the aircraft will reach its MCP target altitude. The map also shows the 
various navigation aids (with their identifiers) in the vicinity of the aircraft in blue. The destination 
runway is shown in white with its 3-letter identifier, with the approach line extending 14 miles. The 
Autoplan shows up on the EHSI as a stippled orange line which turns solid magenta when executed. 
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Figure 9 - Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI) 
The MCP is an autoflight system through which the pilot can change heading, altitude, speed 
and rate of descent. The flight mode (Le., HDG, FLCH, VS, ALT, LNAV, VNAV, and SPD) 
selected in the MCP is displayed on the FMA on the PFD. The MCP used in this experiment (Figure 
10) is modeled on the B747-400 MCP, and the pilot used a mouse as an input device to enter values 
into the MCP. The target values for speed, heading, vertical speed and altitude could be entered by 
the pilots by clicking on the dials below the display window. For example, to change heading, 
clicking on the right half of the circular dial will increase the heading angle and clicking on the left 
half will decrease the heading angle, and similarly for the Indicated Air Speed (IAS) and altitude. 
The vertical speed (V/S) is usually controlled by a roller dial which in this MCP is the pink and 
indigo dial just below the V/S target window. 
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Figure 10 - RFS Mode Control Panel 
The CDU is an autoflight system which, among other things, pilots use to pldreplan flight 
routes. This experiment used a graphical interface CDU (Figure 11) modeled on the B747-400 
CDU, where the pilot used a mouse as an input device to enter data into the CDU. For this 
experiment, the pilot had only the RTE and LEGS pages available to them. Pilots could enter data 
into the scratchpad and insert it wherever desired. 
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Figure 11 - RFS Control Display Unit 
Independent Variables 
Two scenario types were tested, namely, emergency and non-nominal situations. Both of these 
required the pilot to perform tactical planning. 
Non-Nominal Scenarios: These are situations where there is no unusual urgency to land the 
airplane. These are not very important in terms of the time taken to land. All of these cases can be 
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resolved with a simple detour from the original flight plan. The non-nominal scenarios used in this 
experiment were: 
o Runway Closure: Required the pilot to reroute to a nearby alternative. 
o Runway Change: Required the pilot to change the destination runway. 
o Weather Disturbance: Required a pilot to navigate around a weather disturbance i.e., 
a storm cell. 
o Opening up/closing of restricted airspace: Required a pilot to navigate around 
restricted airspace. 
Common to these scenarios is the fact that they envision landing in the order of tens of minutes, 
i.e., immediate landing is not an overwhelming concern. Other factors such as aircraft stability, fuel 
economy, standard operating procedures, etc. are important factors when deciding on the rerouting. 
None of these conditions alter the performance of the aircraft in any way and fuel was not a concern. 
Emergency Scenarios: These are situations where there is an urgency to land the aircraft as soon 
as possible. Thus, in the event of emergencies, the pilots are given a free hand in deciding the route 
to be taken which may involve violating any altitude and speed constraints or procedures. 
Emergency situations can have a number of causes. The emergency scenarios used in this 
experiment were: 
Cargo Fire: This is an emergency wherein a fire in the cargo hold had just been 
extinguished at the start of the run. The extent of damage was not known and the 
pilot was required to land the aircraft as soon as possible. 
Medical Emergency: This emergency required the pilot to replan, reroute and land 
as soon as possible. 
Fuel Filter Emergency: This is an emergency wherein the fuel filter can get blocked 
by debris thereby inhibiting the intake of fuel into the engines. Landing immediately 
is imperative. 
Loss of Hydraulic Pressure in One of the Hydraulic Systems: This is an emergency 
wherein the EICAS shows a loss of hydraulic pressure in one of the hydraulic 
systems. Landing immediately is imperative. 
All of the emergencies were predicted to be of equal severity. However, they are similar in that 
the replanning process still has to be executed and the new route implemented, and they do not alter 
the performance of the aircraft in any way. Emergency scenarios differ from non-nominal scenarios 
in that they envision the time to landing to be less, Le., on the order of a few minutes. 
In each run, the pilot was asked to use a particular type of automation. Specifically, the four 
types of automation tested are detailed were: 
o Mode Control Panel (MCP): Pilots were only allowed to command the following 
autoflight modes through the MCP using heading select and heading hold (HDG), 




o Control Display Unit (CDU): In this condition, pilots were asked to use a 
conventional CDU based on a Honeywell 747-400 CDU. Only pages that assist in 
planning (RTE and LEGS) were made available to them. 
o Control Display Unit + (CDU+): With this type of automation, pilots had the CDU 
available to them as in the previous case. This automation had an added functionality 
called the Autoplan. This is a computer generated flight path that can assist pilots in 
planning. Pilots could access these plans whenever they like and use it as the active 
route, or plan so that their route can intersect parts of the Autoplan, or disregard it 
totally. The Autoplan feature does not exist in current cockpits. 
o Control Display Unit ++ (CDU++): This automation works the same as the CDU+ 
with the difference that, when the simulation run starts, the Autoplan is implemented 
as the active flight route. Pilots have the option of overriding this plan or modifying 
as in the previous automation. In the CDU+ and CDU++, the Autoplan was 
designed to be the best plan for the given scenario type. For example, in the 
emergency scenarios, the Autoplan was designed to get the aircraft down as soon as 
possible, keeping in mind standard airspace regulations and following/intersecting 
standard airways as depicted in the charts. In the non-nominal scenarios, the 
Autoplan placed stress on other factors such as negotiating the cause of re-route and 
minimizing the distance flown. 
Experiment Design 
The experiment was divided into two parts run sequentially in one session. The first experiment 
tested all eight combinations of automation and scenario types. In the second experiment, pilots 
were asked to fly only one run, the ninth run, using the CDU++ type of automation only. The 
experiment condition in this run was based on the same automation-scenario combination for all the 
pilots. The second experiment was included in the tests to explore the effect of an erroneous 
automatically generated plan on pilot performance. This faulty Autoplan scenario followed 
completion of the primary scenarios. 
The first experiment consisted of a 4x2 test matrix as shown in Table 5, and was made up of a 
combination two independent factors, type of automation and scenario type. The test matrix was 
arrived at by first blocking by type of automation. Then, within each block of type of automation, 
the two scenarios types were run in random order. The order of the automation block was based on a 
fully balanced Latin squared design to mitigate order effects. Specific scenarios were assigned 




Table 5. Experiment Test Matrix 
Scenario Type 
I Emergency I Non Nominal I 
16 Pilots x 1 run 16 Pilots x 1 run .- 
Y 
8 runs per pilot 
- 4 runs non-nominal 
- 4 runs emergency 
Run order blocked 
by automation and 
balanced using Latin 
Square Design 
Expt. #1: 
All runs using CDUt+ Faulty 
Autoplan 
1 run per pilot 
- !h pilots had non- 
nominal scenarios 
- % pilots had 
emergency scenarios 
The second experiment consisted of a 1x2 matrix, and was made up of a combination of one 
type of automation, the CDU++-, and the two scenario types. It consisted of only one run per pilot, 
and used a between subjects design, where the scenario types were randomly assigned. This 
experiment used the faulty Autoplan scenario where an error in the automation provided the pilot 
with an inappropriate Autoplan. The plan lacked context sensitivity to the situation and thus did not 
provide the best plan for the current situation, Le., in the non nominal flight condition the Autoplan 
generated an overly aggressive route fit only for emergencies and, in the emergency flight condition, 
provided a gently paced route that increased time of flight beyond what the emergency called for. 
Dependent Measures 
Three types of data were collected: 
1. The graphical interface of the CDU recorded important events in the flight replanning task. 
The final mouse click triggering an event was recorded as an identifiable action. These 
events included switching between RTE and LEGS pages, making changes to an existing 
RTE page or a LEGS page, going through the route programmed in by clicking the PREV 
and NEXT buttons (in the case of the CDU-based autoflight conditions), making altitude, 
speed and heading changes (in the case of the MCP), creatingdeleting a fidwaypoint from 
the flight plan, changing altitude and speed parameters of existing waypoints, resolving 
route discontinuities, looking at alternative routes, activating an inactive route, and 




Aircraft state data, including airspeed, current heading and current altitude, was logged every 
second by the simulator. 
At the end of each run and at the end of the experiment, pilots were asked to answer a 
questionnaire. The end of run questionnaire included questions about the factors considered 
during planning, the strategies used, and effectiveness of the autoflight system used, a rating 
of the ease of planning using that autoflight system compared with currently available type 
of automation they would have used and a NASA TLX workload rating sheet. The end of 
experiment questionnaire included questions on pilot background, in-flight replanning in the 
two scenario types, flight replanning systems and tools, performance of the Autoplan and the 
NASA TLX pair-wise comparisons of sources of load. The complete end of run 
questionnaire and end of experiment questionnaire are given in Appendix B. 
Analysis of the aircraft state data, event logs during the flight, performance logs during the 
flight, measures such as duration and the length of the run, modifications to the Autoplan and pilots’ 
responses to the questionnaires included: 
a 
a Pilot dependency on automation; 
a 
a 
Ability to diagnose/recognize errors in automation; 
Time and distance saved for that run compared with the original plan; 
Pilot’s choice of route implemented and the apparent reasons behind the choice. 
This could indicate the correlation (if any) between type of automation, type of scenario and 
in-flight replanning behavior; 
saved compared with the time taken if the original path was followed; 
a Deviation from the existing preprogrammed route to indicate the amount of time 
Time taken to start modifying the existing plan or entering a new plan; 
Regularity with which they tend to update the plan versus leaving it once it has been 
Apparent strategies and factors considered during planning; 
Pilot preferences of certain autoflight systems for in-flight replanning tasks; 
Comparison of ease of planning using different autoflight systems; 
Performance of the Autoplan; and 









The data analysis was divided into three categories: pilot performance, pilot planning behavior, 
Performance was measured in the first experiment by time to landing and distance to landing. In 
and workload assessment. 
the ninth run, pilot performance was also measured by whether pilots recognized the Autoplan was 
faulty. 
for planning with the MCP and the CDU such as establishing one-dimension of path first followed 
Planning behavior can be manifested in a number of ways. Apparent strategies were analyzed 
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by the other. For example, some pilots may prefer to plan for the lateral path first and then the 
vertical path. Others may plan for the vertical path first and then the lateral path so that they don’t 
need to descend at a high rate, yet others may do it as a series of heading changes followed by 
descents. In some cases, some pilots may start planning immediately and bring out a rough plan and 
then keep refining that plan over time, whereas others may take some more time and come up with 
an almost concrete plan which requires few adjustments. 
performed to examine which source of workload was felt the most during the scenarios. 
A workload assessment based on pilot responses to the NASA TLX Workload sheet was also 
Results 
In total, 144 runs were performed: 128 under the first experiment comparing the different 
autoflight systems and 16 runs for the second experiment’s faulty Autoplan case. The 16 faulty 
Autoplan runs will be discussed separately from the regular 128 runs. 
type, specific scenario and run order effects by fitting to a general linear model. If the residuals of 
the fit met the requirements for Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), an ANOVA was conducted. The 
type of automation, scenario type and specific scenario were analyzed as fixed effects. Pilots, 
however, were analyzed as a random factor, allowing generalization of the observations to a major 
portion of the pilot population. In addition, interactions between the factors were examined. 
Where significant results were found for one or more of the factors, a one-way (ANOVA), along 
with a pair-wise comparison using a 95% confidence level Tukey test, was performed strictly on 
those factors to confirm the results. A non parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was also performed to test 
the null hypothesis that there are no differences among the factors. 
Unless otherwise specified, the data obtained were analyzed for type of automation, scenario 
Pilot Performance 
The primary measures of pilot performance in the first experiment were the distance flown and 
the duration of the run. In emergency situations, such as a medical emergency or cargo fire, these 
measures directly reflect the safety of the aircraft. In non nominal situations, such as weather or 
airport closures, these measures reflect airline operation considerations such as flight time, flight 
schedules and fuel burn. As can be seen in Figures 12 and 13, in both scenario types, the type of 
automation used was not a significant factor. No significant order effects were seen on these 
measures either. The scenario type and the specific scenario, however, did show a significant effect 
on these measures. To confirm the scenario and scenario type effects, an ANOVA was performed, 
showing a significant scenario effect (F = 33.92, p< 0.001) and an effect from the scenario type (F = 
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Figure 12 - Average Time of Flight 
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Figure 13 - Average Distance Flown 
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Since the type of automation did not have any significant effect on the performance measures of 
time and distance, these measures were also looked at by specific scenario across all types of 
automation. As seen in Figures 14 and 15, in the non nominal scenarios, the average time of flight 
and distance flown were distinctly higher for the first two scenarios: weather disturbance and 
restricted airspace. A certain degree of variability in flight path was seen. In the emergency 
scenarios, time of flight and distance flown was higher for the second two: the hydraulic systems 
failure and fuel filter emergencies. 
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Figure 14 - Average Time of Flight per Scenario 
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Figure 15 - Average Distance Flown per Scenario 
Although the scenarios were intended to have similar travel times, to account for any intended 
differences between scenarios, another measure was the deviation in time of flight and distance 
flown from the baseline plans for each scenario. The baseline plans used were the original routes in 
the CDU at the start of the run. As can be seen in Figures 16 and 17, the main effects here were also 
the scenario type (F = 66.43, p< 0.001) and the scenario (F = 14.72, p< 0.001). Additionally, no run 
order effects were seen with the time of flight measure, but the distance flown showed significant 
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Figure 16 - Average Deviation in Time of Flight 
40 
10 
O i  I I 1 
MCP cw CDW C W  
Type of Automation 
Figure 17 - Average Deviation in Distance Flown 
13 
* I 
Figure 18 - Run Order Effect on Deviation in Distance Flown 
Another measure pertaining to pilot planning performance were the speed violations. According 
to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, aircraft flying below 10000 feet must remain 
at a speed of 250 knots or below, except when given discretion by a controller or in an emergency. 
The scenario, scenario type and run order showed significant effects on this measure as did the 
pilot-scenario interaction. However, all these effects failed normality tests and an ANOVA could 
not be conducted. Order effects were also seen but also failed subsequent normality tests. However, 
the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test showed that the medical emergency (emergency) had the 
highest number of speed violations and the weather disturbance (non-nominal) had the lowest 
number of speed violations. 
Pilot Planning Behavior 
A number of measures examined pilot planning behavior. First the flight paths were looked at 
for any trends in planning behavior. As an example, the flight paths are shown in Figure 19 for the 
medical emergency scenario. During the experiment it was observed that the type of automation 
and scenario had an effect on pilots’ course of action. For this reason, to describe the effect of the 
automation on planning behavior, the measures were also analyzed by the type of automation. The 
specific scenario effect was also considered to explain specific behaviors. 
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Figure 19 - Flight Paths for the Medical Emergency Scenario 
General Observations on Planning Behavior 
In general, in each scenario type, the primary objectives were to minimize distance to go and to 
create an expeditious route to the approach. The timing and ordering of fixes did not show any 
specific pattern by which a pilot tended to plan. The usage of the type of automation also showed 
very specific personal choice traits. For example, 10 of 16 pilots, with all types of automation, 
immediately increased speed and kept a high altitude to get abeam of the outer marker as fast 
possible. All pilots except one created an along track waypoint ahead of the waypoint being flown 
direct to, at which point they started reducing speed. In 58.3% of the runs where pilots could create 
along track waypoints (CDU, CDU+ and CDU++ types of automation = 96 runs), this point was 
abeam of the outer marker, which would give them a much smoother turn onto the final approach 
leg. When using the MCP, this point was visually marked out (as verbally reported by pilots during 
the experiment) and then HDG SEL was used to turn onto final. When using the CDU and its 
variants, all pilots used the only the LEGS page during planning as this provided the necessary 
information of heading, distance, and speed and altitude constraints at waypoints. In general, 14 
pilots agreed with the routing the Autoplan provided; however, they did not agree with the speed 
and altitude profile in the Autoplan and proceeded to make subsequent changes. Most pilots used 
the Autoplan to orient themselves in the desired direction and then modified the waypoints to create 
a more direct route to the runway. 
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In terms of dimensional planning, in all cases, pilots first got themselves oriented in the desired 
direction. This was then followed by a ‘cleaning up’ of the route, where some waypoints were 
deleted or added to provide a more direct route. This was then followed by a series of speed and 
altitude changes until the termination point. Speed and altitude changes did not follow any specific 
pattern. 
Some interesting observations in usage of the type of automation were made during the 
experiment. Some of the pilots, in order to reduce workload, would simply ‘tick‘ the CDU into 
behaving like an MCP. For example, in a long stretch, the pilot would put in a very low altitude 
constraint at the active waypoint, which in turn would provide a high rate of descent, and then 
change the altitude constraints back to specified limits when at a suitable distance from the 
waypoint. Only two pilots resorted to this technique as they did remember that they would not be 
allowed to use the MCP when using the CDU or its variants. 
instead of creating a waypoint abeam or a little ahead of the marker, pilots would wait till the 
aircraft was abeam or a little ahead of the marker and then initiate a DIRECT-TO to the outer 
marker after accounting for the distance required for a turn. This proved extremely effective, and 
had a result similar to that of creating a waypoint, albeit the turn required was sharper. This 
behavior was exhibited in five runs spread among two pilots. In all scenarios, the pilots were cleared 
to the glideslope altitude. Thus, when using the CDU and its variants, in most cases, pilots would 
enter the clearance altitude into the altitude window in the MCP and then adjust the vertical profile 
by altitude changes in the CDU LEGS pages. This was done to eliminate the altitude intervention by 
the MCP. 
Another technique commonly used by the pilots was the DIRECT-TO function. In some cases, 
Pilot Planning Across Automation Types 
In the MCP cases, whenever a new speed or altitude target was entered and kept constant for at 
least fifteen seconds, it was counted as a speed or altitude change. For the CDU cases, the change in 
a future speed or altitude or both was identified as an event and logged in the simulator. It was 
observed that the average number of speed and altitude changes when using the MCP was distinctly 
lower than for the other types of automation which is evidenced by Figure 20 and Figure but did 
not show any statistical significance. This suggests that with the MCP, pilots did not have the 
hindrance of forcibly changing speed and altitude constraints at waypoints as was required with the 
other TOAs. Among all the types of automation, the CDU+ was found to have the highest average 
number of speed and altitude changes. This suggests that these measures are more a function of 
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Figure 21 - Average Number of Altitude Changes 
Two more measures examined pilot behavior with the CDU (and its variants). These were the 
time taken to the first modification and the time taken for the first execution of a change to the route 
in the CDU from the start of the run. The time taken to first modification was defined as the time 
difference between the start of the run and the first instance when the page status (either the RTE or 
LEGS page) changes from active (ACT) to modified (MOD), and the time taken for the first 
execution was defined as the time difference between the start of the run and the first instance of the 
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EXEC button being pressed to confirm an action. These measures were indicative of the time the 
pilot takes to start planning and implement a change to the plan. A combination of these two 
measures showed that on an average, pilots took a shorter time to start re-planning using the CDU+ 
type of automation than with CDU or CDUH. 
In addition to the above, apparent strategies in planning were also examined. A general pattern 
that did emerge was that pilots oriented themselves in the desired direction first (mostly direct to a ' 
point abeam the marker) by either using HDG SEL in MCP cases or initiating a DIRECT-TO in the 
CDU (and its variants) cases. This was followed by vertical profile management via speed and 
altitude changes to get to that point, followed by a turn to base leg to line up for approach fully 
configured. Figures 22 and 23 show the real paths and planning pattern for a non-nominal scenario 
(weather disturbance) and an emergency scenario (loss of hydraulic pressure) respectively. 
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Figure 23 - Flight Paths and Altitude and Speed Changes in the Hydraulic Pressure Loss 
Scenario 
Twelve of 16 pilots were at a point abeam the marker at the landing speed and glideslope 
altitude from where they started their turn onto final approach. The remaining four gave themselves 
a little more time by taking a turn further out from the marker and descending during the turn. This, 
however, resulted in three of the pilots reaching the outer marker (termination point) at an altitude 
higher than glideslope intercept altitude. The fourth pilot, due to high speed at the turn, did not have 
sufficient time and distance to slow down to the outer marker speed constraint. He did make the 
altitude constraint but could not line up for approach and was a little offset from the course. It was 
also observed that speed and altitude changes were made in no particular order, except that one was 
made only after the other was established. It was also seen that, in almost all the cases where a turn 
onto the base leg was required, pilots maintained a high speed up to a point abeam the marker and 
had shallow turns onto final approach. 
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An analysis of the subjective questionnaires revealed that the most common factors considered 
during re-planning were the distance to go, weather, time, and aircraft safety (Figure 24). In general, 
all pilots said that the first priority was to minimize the time of flight and the distance to go, 
irrespective of the situation. Other considerations included factors such as aircraft performance, 
safety of the maneuver and efficiency (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25 - Strategies in Choosing the Route Planned and Implemented 
Pilot Planning Using the Mode Control Panel 
When comparing the flight paths for the scenarios types (Appendix D. l), it was seen that, when 
using the MCP for the weather disturbance, two pilots went right of the weather and two pilots went 
left of the weather. Pilots who went right of the weather said it was easier to line up for approach 
and did not require any adverse maneuvering. In the restricted airspace scenario, it was seen that 
three pilots went right of the restricted areas and one went left. In the remaining non nominal 
scenarios, all the pilots followed similar right downwind paths. For the emergency scenarios, all 
pilots took the same right downwind and base leg paths. However, average speeds for the 
emergency scenarios were distinctly higher than for the non nominal scenarios, with two pilots 
flying a substantial length of the run at 400 knots in the medical emergency scenario. 
to 5 times per run. Related to the usage of HDG SEL was the usage of the heading hold (HDG 
HLD) mode. This measure showed that pilots engaged this mode once on average for emergency 
(ranging from 0 to 4) and non nominal scenarios (also ranging from 0 to 4). Though the scenario did 
not show any significant effect on the usage of this mode, the average mode engagement for these 
two modes was higher for the emergency scenarios. The only significant factor here was the pilot, 
which suggests that the use of these modes for lateral navigation is more a personal choice. 
A comparison of flight level change (FLCH) and vertical speed ( V / S )  modes showed that V/S 
mode proved to be a preferred mode for vertical navigation. It was observed that 2 of 16 pilots did 
not engage the FLCH mode in either of the scenarios in which they use the MCP. The specific 
scenario also did not affect their choice as was revealed in discussions during the experiment. The 
reason given was that they like to have control over the descent rates which can be defined in the 
V/S mode, but is internally calculated by the autopilot in the FLCH mode. None of the main effects 
Heading select (HDG SEL) was the most frequently used mode. HDG SEL was engaged from 1 
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had any significant effect on these two modes, which suggests that usage of these modes is a 
personal choice of pilots. Six pilots said that for emergencies, they preferred to use the more 
aggressive FLCH for climb and descent maneuvers. Seven pilots said they preferred V/S as it 
allowed them to control their own rate of descentklimb, though it did increase workload and 
monitoring activities slightly. The remaining three pilots did not give any preference in using these 
modes for vertical navigation. 
Pilot Planning Using the Control Display Unit (CDU) 
In the CDU (and its variants) cases, each click of the EXEC button was logged. The EXEC 
button was required to be pressed every time a change to the route was to be entered as the active 
route to be followed by the FMS. Specifically, these changes included adding/deleting a waypoint, 
erasing the previous action, resolving a route discontinuity, and making a speed or altitude 
modification. This was useful in analyzing the number of times that the plan was updated, and how 
thoroughly the pilots planned their task, i.e., whether they formed a skeletal plan and refined it along 
the way or took a little more time and proceed to implement a more concrete plan with fewer 
modifications. 
When the timing of the EXEC button hits was looked at, it was seen that pilots who took longer 
to start and execute their plans had a spate of modifications and executions in the initial part of their 
plan and consequently fewer modifications along the way. This did reinforce the inference that the 
pilots who took longer to start planning had a more concrete idea of their planned route than other 
pilots. In addition to the above, it was observed that 10 of 16 pilots updated their plans more 
frequently in the non nominal scenarios than the emergency, five pilots updated their emergency 
plans more frequently and one showed no difference. 
Pilot Planning Using the CDU with Autoplan Available (CDU+) 
From a comparison of the flight paths for both scenario types, it was seen that, for the weather 
disturbance, only one pilot intentionally decided against the Autoplan and went to the right of the 
weather. The reasons given were the ease of lining up for approach and that it was a non nominal 
scenario. In the runway change scenario only one pilot followed the Autoplan route (with a few 
modifications) on its right downwind path, simply agreeing with the route in general and assuming 
that Autoplan gave the best route. 
Pilots’ reliance on the Autoplan was examined by the number of runs in which the Autoplan 
was the active route at the point when the run was terminated. When using the CDU+, one pilot did 
not use the Autoplan at all. Additionally, 7 of 16 pilots were seen to have used the Autoplan for 
both scenarios. From the remaining eight pilots, four used the Autoplan only for the emergency 
scenarios and four others used it only for the non nominal scenarios. In all runs where the Autoplan 
was used, modifications were made for a more direct route and to the speeds and altitudes in no 
particular order. 
Pilot Planning Using the CDU with Autoplan Active at Start (CDU++) 
From a comparison of the flight paths for the non nominal and emergency scenario types, it was 
observed that, for the non nominal scenarios, only one pilot (runway change scenario) chose to 
follow a route different to the others. In this case, however, the pilot simply followed the Autoplan 
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route assuming it was the best route. From discussions and responses, it emerged that only distance 
and time were the important factors taken into account. In the remaining three non nominal 
scenarios, all the pilots followed similar downwind patterns with the corresponding turns to base 
leg. In the emergency scenarios, only one pilot followed a different route (fuel filter scenario). 
In all runs using CDU++, the Autoplan was maintained as the active route up to the end of the 
run. However, changes were made to get a more direct routing, and also to speeds and altitudes to 
ensure a safe and expeditious flight. Another observation made here was that 9 of 16 pilots made 
substantial modifications to the Autoplan to the extent that they followed a different downwind path 
compared to the Autoplan. 
i- 
Pilot Interaction with Automation 
Pilot responses and simulator log files also gave us insight into the reliance of the pilots on the 
Autoplan. In general, all pilots with the exception of two agreed with the general routing that the 
Autoplan provided, but also concurred that they required speed and altitude changes and, in some 
emergency cases, quite extensive changes. However, they did approve of the Autoplan feature. The 
sole pilot who did not like the Autoplan feature did categorically state that he was not a big fan of 
automation as he did not agree with the extent to which it delegates control of the aircraft away 
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Figure 26 - Number of Runs with Modified Autoplan Active until End of Run 
On the completion of each scenario, pilots were asked a series of questions pertaining to 
replanning in that scenario using the type of automation they used. Among the questions asked was 
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a comparative evaluation of the automation used to what they would have preferred to use for that 
scenario on a Likert scale from ‘Easier’ to ‘More Difficult’ (Figure 27). It should be noted that, in 
each type of automation, there are a total of 32 runs with 16 pilots undergoing 2 runs each, one for 
each scenario type. These include cases where in a pilot may have preferred a different type of 
automation for each scenario type. 
Type of Automation Pilots Preferred Comparison to Automation Used 
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Figure 27 - Pilot Comparison of Automation Used with Preferred Automation 
An interesting read from the above figure is that some pilots preferred to use a particular type of 
automation even though it resulted in more work for them and planning was more difficult. This 
could arise out of familiarity with the system currently being used and how often pilots use these in 
real world situations. 
At the end of the experiment, the pilots were asked to rank the planning tools available to them; 
from best (1) to worst (4), according to which one was they felt was more useful for each scenario 
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Figure 28 - Pilot Rankings of Automation Types per Scenario Type 
From Figure 28 it was quite apparent that the CDU+ was the automation preferred by the pilots 
in the experiment with 62.5% of pilots rating it the best for the non nominal scenarios and 50% 
rating it the best in the emergency scenarios. Interestingly, 56% of pilots rated the MCP the worst 
for the non nominal scenarios and 50% rating it the worst in emergencies. A Wilcoxon signed 
ranking test (non parametric) was performed on the above response for both scenario types. In both 
scenario types, the CDU+ was rated as the best type of automation. 
Finally pilots were also asked to describe the performance of the Autoplan. This was not 
specific to any scenario type. Table 6 shows the response of each pilot to the question: “How would 
you describe the performance of the Autoplan? Please elaborate. ” , and it can seen that all but two 
pilots approved of the Autoplan function although some also stipulated caveats such as wanting to 
double check the route it suggests. 
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Table 6 - Pilot Responses to Performance of Autoplan 





1 Pilot 6 
Pilot 7 
Pilot 8 







would you describe the performance of the Autoplan? Please elaborate. 
It gave a very viable option that you could choose or reject. It would save 
effort and thought process if it was elected 
I found Autoplan very easy to use and it made my workload much less. 
Autoplan is a great idea if implemented correctly. It needs the ability to pick 
waypoints that are likely to be used in a given airspace. I think this could be 
accomplished in part by surveying ATC and having them suggest alternate 
route in their airspace. Another constraint is CDU memory, which is in short 
supply in the 757/767s I fly. As long as Autoplan has the ability to pick a 
logical, likely route, it will be a good thing. If however, it picks routes that 
will not be used in real life, it will become a button that never gets used. 
Helpful as a suggestion, that can be easily modified. Adds fixes that can be 
used without typing. 
Autoplan has no way of knowing what the objective is. Therefore, it may 
offer a long route when a short route is desired. I believe in most cases, I 
would not use AutoDlan. 
I would not have picked most of the routes it did. A little aggressive for 
passenger operations and routes were longer. 
I liked Autoplan. Not sure that I wanted it to switch to it automatically 
(CDUW), but I found the displayed alternate route very helpful in picking 
the route I would use. 
Coupled with the visual representation, it provides me with great options; 
however, I am concerned about ATC's ability to go along with the plan. 
It may offer a good solution, then again it may not. Autoplan is not the best 
solution in all cases but at least look at it to evaluate it 
Good. It gave a quick route with an appropriate lead into final. 
Good. It gives a viable routing to destination and allows you to refine as 
necessary. 
I think it can be a useful system because it can save cockpit workload. It 
depends on how closely it would match optimum route and how likely pilot 
could stay on that route and not be altered by ATC. 
Generally good, but needs to be modified based on current factors. 
I think the Autoplan is a great tool, but it needs to be treated only as a tool to 
help me make rerouting decisions. 
It provided a shorter route to the airport. However ATC usually does the 
same to the extent that traffic allows. 
In general good. In time critical situations, it can give a good plan quickly 
and then you can take time refining it. 
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Workload Assessment 
To assess the workload involved in each scenario, the pilot was asked to complete NASA Task 
Load Index (TLX) ratings at the end of every run. The worksheet probed the pilot for their personal 
assessment of workload on a continuous scale. Workload itself was broken down into 6 categories: 
mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration. Workload 
within each type of automation is shown in Figure . For each of the above categories, a general 
linear model was fitted to examine the main effects. Subsequent ANOVA test were done where 
applicable. Categories which failed normality conditions were subjected to non parametric tests to 
examine any differences within the independent variables. 
Kolmogorov-Smimov normality test @>O. 150), thus disallowing an ANOVA. Subsequently, a non 
parametric test, the Kruskal-Wallis Test was performed which showed no significant effect of 
scenario (H = 1.76, P = 0.972) or type of automation (H = 0.94, P = 0.815) on mental demand. 
As with mental demand, physical demand also failed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test 
(p>O. 15), thus rendering the ANOVA test unusable. Similarly, a non parametric test revealed no 
effect of automation or scenario on physical demand, but run order effects were found. However, 
discussions with pilots and observations during the experiment revealed that any physical demand 
was more a result of using a virtual graphical user interface than of planning. Temporal demand 
also failed the normality conditions, when fitted to a general linear model. A non-parametric test 
revealed no significance of the main effects on this measure. The performance self-rating showed a 
significant automation effect (F=15.81, p<O.OOl). A 95% confidence Tukey test was further 
performed, which revealed that the MCP had the worst effect on performance. Pilot ratings of their 
effort were not affected by the automation types. However, the specific scenario did show a 
significant effect (F=4.33, p=0.040) on effort. Specifically, the weather disturbance scenario and the 
restricted airspace scenario had the most effect on effort among all the scenarios. Frustration was 
generally low and none of the variables showed any significant effect on the frustration level 
experienced by pilots during the task. Pilots may have reported a low frustration level in using the 
different autoflight systems since they have been exposed to these systems in real aircraft. 
Subsequent non parametric tests also failed any appreciable difference in any of the main effects. 
The average workload rating (unweighted average of the TLX sub-scales) did not vary much 
with scenario type. In fact these were more specific to the type of automation wherein the workload 
rating for both scenario types was highest for the MCP and the lowest for the CDU+ (Figure 30) but 
was not statistically significant. 
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Figure 29 - Average TLX Workload Ratings for the Planning Task 
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Figure 30 - Average Total Workload 
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‘Faulty Autoplan’ Scenario 
The faulty Autoplan scenario that was run after completion of the first eight runs provided 
insight into the effect that a faulty Autoplan may have on the pilot’s performance. Specifically the 
CDU++ generated a faulty plan which the aircraft would immediately start to follow at the 
beginning of the scenario. The Autoplan was erroneous in that, in a non nominal scenario type, it 
would provide a plan that was extremely aggressive and not safe for normal airline operations, i.e., 
it would generate an over aggressive plan that was suitable for a critical emergency. Likewise, for an 
emergency scenario type, it would generate a more circuitous route unsuitable for emergency, 
thereby ignoring the primary measures of time and distance. Eight pilots ran the ninth run in the non 
nominal scenario and eight pilots ran it for the emergency scenario, thereby giving 16 runs (data 
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Figure 32 - Flight Paths for Emergency Faulty Autoplan Scenario 
Although there are an insufficient number of data points for a statistical analysis, some trends 
merit discussion. Regardless of scenario type, pilots' primary aim was to minimize time aloft and 
distance to travel. In the non nominal scenarios six out of eight pilots did not activate the original 
route (RTE 1) but chose to modify the Autoplan. The two pilots that did activate the original route 
took, from the start of the run, an average time of 2.13 1 minutes to activate and 2.489 minutes to 
start modifying the route (the other six pilots took an average time of 1.261 minutes to start 
modifying the route). This suggests that they did evaluate the two plans available. 
modifications to the active plan was six whereas, for the other six pilots, the number of 
modifications increased to eight, thereby suggesting that the original route was better than the 
Autoplan and required less modification, which was subsequently verified through observations and 
comments made by the pilots during the experiment and debriefing. 
The number of modifications to the plan was measured by the number of times the pilots 
pressed the EXEC button to execute a modification. In the emergency scenarios five out of eight 
pilots did not activate the original route (RTE 1) but chose to modify the Autoplan. The three pilots 
that did activate the original route, however, took an average time of 0.483 minutes to do so. This 
suggests that they immediately recognized the erroneous Autoplan and proceeded to activate the 
original plan. In the non nominal scenario, the average deviation in distance flown was 10.562 miles 
with a corresponding saving in flight time of 7.027 minutes. For the emergencies these measures 
corresponded to 10.295 minutes saved in flight time and 25.819 miles saved in flying distance. 
These were measured by the difference in times of the modified route and the unmodified active 
route. Figures 33 and 34 show a snapshot of the various measures for the faulty Autoplan scenario: 
It was observed that in cases where pilots activated the original route, the average number of 
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Figure 33 - Planning Performance Measures in Faulty Autoplan Scenario 
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Figure 34 - Planning Behavior Measures for Faulty Autoplan Scenario 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
The results of this experiment suggest that pilot behavior and performance differs in different 
situations, be it non nominal or emergency. When pilots used only the MCP, the time of flight and 
the length was lower (Le., better) than with the other types of automation. With the MCP, the 
emergency scenarios showed markedly lower values for the primary measures of performance than 
the non nominal scenarios, which had a stronger effect on the safety of the flight. This was 
attributed mainly to the fact that pilots did not need to spend too much time creating and modifying 
fixes, but rather spent more time on speed and altitude changes. 
The CDU only, however, showed a slight degradation in pilot performance. The workload 
assessment showed no significant difference from that with the MCP, but the primary measures of 
time of flight and length of run were the highest in this type of automation. Average deviations were 
about the same as that of the MCP suggesting that resulting plans were similar, but the comparative 
flights varied substantially. The non nominal scenarios show higher averages for time and distance 
than the emergency scenarios; however, these also show a markedly higher average for the 
emergency scenarios when compared with the MCP only case with no appreciable change in overall 
workload. This case did show a higher level of frustration than the other automation types mainly 
because pilots had to spend time entering and modifling fixes, and, in some cases, pilots had been 
previously been exposed to the other variants of the CDU. 
The variants of the CDU, namely CDU+ and CDU++, were well received by the pilots because 
of the additional Autoplan feature which was found to tremendously reduce pilot workload during 
replanning. Though the CDU+ did show a relatively higher temporal demand for both scenario 
types, it showed overall a much better performance in reducing time and distance and the 
subsequent total workload. 
It was also seen that with all the variants of the CDU, pilots made substantial changes to the 
Autoplan. The Autoplans were created to meet mind airspace regulations; however, the inability of 
the plan to take advantage of the air traffic controller giving the pilot discretion over the route 
explained the changes made by the pilots to the Autoplan. These factors highlight the need for 
careful design of the Autoplan generator to be context sensitive including the ability to generate 
plans for both non-nominal and emergency situations and to take advantage of relaxed ATC 
restrictions. Pilot comments concerning the performance and usefulness of the Autoplan were more 
favorable than indicated by the performance measures. Indeed, most of the pilots believed that the 
Autoplan could be useful but at the same time expressed a number of concerns about its 
implementation. 
automatically generated plan is an endeavor worth pursuing which provides the pilot much needed 
assistance in replanning a flight route. Additionally, it was observed that pilots tended to think of 
plans as a two dimensional space at any time. 
Although this research specifically studied airline pilots’ planning behavior in glass cockpit 
using current autoflight interfaces (MCP and CDU), the results suggest several broader implications 
for cockpit planning aids in general. The most important is the level of intelligence required by the 
FMS to generate such a plan on its own. While most pilots did say it was useful, some shot down 
the idea on the ground that they preferred to either create their own plans (even if it increased 
workload a little and increased time), or hand fly the aircraft as it afforded more control of the 
The results of this preliminary experiment suggest that the functional concept of an 
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aircraft. In this experiment, for example, some pilots pointed out that the Autoplan did give a very 
good initial routing with minimal route changes, but was not very effective with the speed and 
altitude management. 
Successful implementation of such a concept is highly dependent on the level of artificial 
intelligence, context sensitivity to and the sensing of external factors such as traffic, weather and 
terrain. The objective function or the goal of the plan should coincide with the specific situation at 
hand, be it non nominal or emergency in nature and whether the aircraft has been compromised or 
not. 
Some pilots also observed that such a concept would be more useful in an en-route environment 
as terminal area traffic control is far stricter and more stringently regulated. A more dynamic and 
real time update of the plan would also be useful with additional information in the form of ETA to 
active waypoints would also be helpful to pilots. 
subsequently the CDU+) did not have much effect on pilot behavior, it could be located in the 
aircraft FMS or used by air traffic control level to create better aircraft routings, perhaps updated 
when the situation changes. 
Other additions that may prove to be helpful are a complementary display which shows a 
vertical and horizontal display of the Autoplan in a space relative to other routes and traffic, 
weather, and terrain, as well as supplemental information of estimated time to travel, estimated 
distance to go, estimated fuel consumption and savings on time and distance compared to the 
previous plan. These additions, with subsequent testing, can better confirm the effectiveness of such 
a concept. 
With the development of free flight, the concept of an automatic plan generator would greatly 
enhance in-flight re-planning tasks and could have better context sensitivity if, in addition to the 
above mentioned enhancements, Autoplan could incorporate ‘Party Line’ Information (PLI) such as 
real time and current pilot reports about weather and traffic, Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) 
information such as airspace system status, equipment availability and weather, and the output of 
other tools such as the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) for conflict prediction, passive Final 
Approach Spacing Tool (pFAST) for terminal area arrival and departure streaming operations, and 
Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) for en-route traffic management. 
Results also bring into focus the effectiveness of the control display unit as a replanning 
interface. With its text display and keystroke method of data entry, planning interfaces such as touch 
screens which allow pilots to graphically pick waypoints and define a flight path may prove to be 
both easier to use and facilitate pilots in creating better plans. Such a system does not call for 
elimination of the CDU from the flight management system, but current methods of using planning 
interfaces in flight decks do call for a more efficient interface. Such a system would be efficient in 
that pilots would have the system in front of them (thus allowing pilots to monitor other flight 
instruments simultaneously), reduce physical movements in terms of data entry into the FMS and 
not requiring the pilot to constantly go heads down when creating the plan and then looking up to 
verify the plan. 
Perhaps a more important question is the location of such a system. Though the Autoplan (and 
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Summary 
Prior research has, even in relatively low-fidelity and simple simulator tests, found situations 
where pilots had difficulty in planning and flying a safety trajectory in an emergency. Likewise, 
early results suggest that intelligent cockpit system can potentially aid pilots at this difficult task, if 
they are imbued with the correct knowledge and logic. This project has outlined a series of multi- 
disciplinary research tasks which lay the foundation for these knowledge and logic requirements, 
and test their efficacy through the development and simulator testing of a prototype cockpit system, 
and through examination of other applications of these research gains in procedure development. 
While these results help specify a flight capable system to aid pilots in emergency situations, they 
also may have a far-wider impact than the isolated development of one system. The knowledge 
gained provide researchers and designers with a better theoretical understanding, based on empirical 
research, of how pilots plan trajectories, use procedures, and react to emergencies. From this, 
insights have been made on the representation of procedures, and on the use of automated systems 
in aeronautics. 
These results are also being prepared for broader dissemination in the scientific community by 
publishing in peer-reviewed technical journals. 
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